


Spring - Fall 1946



Christianity and Society

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by

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SPRING 1946

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction

PUBLISHED BY THE FELLOWSHIP OF SOCIALIST CHRISTIANS

FELLOWSHIP MEETING

The Spring meeting of the Fellowship will be on Thursday and Friday, May 23rd and 24th, either in New York City or in an adjacent community where accommodations can be had. We ask the members and friends of the Fellowship to reserve these dates. The general topic is: "The Christian Faith and the World Situation". The detailed topics have not yet been assigned though one of them will deal with the relationship of Protestantism and Catholicism in world politics. Among those who have been asked to lead discussions are Professor A. T. Mollegen of the Theological Seminary in Alexandria, Virginia, and Professor J. L. Hromadka of Princeton Seminary.

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EDITORIALS

The Limits of Human Power

It has been shocking enough to learn that man's freedom has risen to the point of his ability to annihilate civilization completely through atomic warfare. There were suggestions from physicists that the human capacity exceeded even this limit and included the possibility of destroying our physical universe. "We have proved" said Professor Zillard that the world is inflammable; all that is required is for someone to find the match for it". It now appears that these apprehensions are exaggerated, not to say hysterical. Several scientists have testified before the McMahon senatorial committee that the match which would ignite the world would have to be hotter than the temperature at the center of the sun. We do not pretend to understand the intricacies of the theories by which this ultimate peril is regarded as either probability or an impossibility. But we are inclined on general principles to agree with Dr. Bethe and those of his scientific colleagues who discount this peril.

The prospects are grim enough, without adding this final apprehension. Perhaps it is just the fact that we were loath to sacrifice the relevance of the words of the Psalmist. "The Lord reigneth, he is clothed in majesty.—The world also is established that it cannot be moved.—

The floods have lifted up O Lord, the floods have lifted up their voice; the floods lift up their waves. The Lord on high is mightier than the noise of many waters, yea than the mighty waves of the sea."

Evidently it is still true that the physical structure of the world is still secure against the hand of man. But he has almost unlimited power of destruction in the world of history.

The Church and the Kingdom

"Only the church" declared the Pope in the consistory in which all the new Cardinals were created "can bring men back from the shadows to the light. She alone can make men conscious of the past, master of the present and secure in the future. Her supernational character does not act like an empire which extends its tentacles in all directions with the aim of dominion over the world. Like the mother of a family she only gathers around her all her sons scattered over the world. Do we not see how Christ the Divine victim, His arms outstretched from one end of the world to the other, embraces and holds at the same time in its past, present and future the entire human society"?

Here is the usual identification of Christ and the church so familiar in

Catholic thought. "Christ the divine victim" does indeed have this position in human history. But the church as an institution shows little inclination to be a "divine victim". She battles desperately for her life. In Argentine and Spain she is, even now, making and preserving dubious political alliances for the sake of her organizational preservation; and losing her life in the hope of saving it. Not only the Catholic church, but every church is tempted to do that; which is why the church is wrong in identifying itself with Christ, though it may rightfully claim that it is the place in human society where Christ is known and where his Spirit breaks through, even despite the betrayals of that spirit in the life of the church itself.

Technics, Logic and Salvation

It is significant that an age which hoped for salvation by reason should have to make a final desperate effort to save its creed and the life of its civilization by trying to establish a world government in order to avoid the catastrophe of atomic warfare.

Reason, according to the eighteenth century would redeem man partly by inventing the technical instruments for the mastery of nature; and partly by furnishing the power which would control man's irrational passions and interests. Always it was assumed that evil came from the inertial force of "nature" and salvation from the mind.

The most obvious refutation of the first part of this creed is furnished by the atomic bomb. Technical science "masters" nature in the sense that it continually increases human power through harnessing natural forces. But this brings no salvation to man. Man

is surprised to suddenly find himself in the possession of a power which seems primarily destructive. This cannot be, cries modern man in consternation. We must find a logical-rational solution for the peril which we confront by the development of our technical-rational powers.

The most obvious rational solution for this problem is to make men so "objective" and impartial in the use of their new power that it could not possibly be used by one part of the human community against another. That would be complete rationality. But even modern rationalism cannot long entertain this way out as a possibility because too many facts of contemporary history refute it. The bomb is actually in the hands of one nation or group of nations; and arouses the fury of fear and resentment from those who do not possess it. Reason is obviously too weak to transcend this conflict of fears and ambitions.

It is this situation which tempts modern culture to attempt Thomas Hobbes' solution of the social and political issue. According to Hobbes the first effect of reason in man is, not to mitigate, but to accentuate the desires and impulses of the animal world. But man fortunately possesses sufficient rational transcendence to observe that the war of all against all, which result from these immoderate ambitions, leads to mutual annihilation. This recognition prompts men to create a powerful state which will hold the anarchy of men (and now of nations) in check.

Following this logic of Hobbes, our modern proponents of world government argue that we are driven by logic and reason to create a powerful world government which will prevent our

mutual annihilation. Our situation is more serious than the one Hobbes faced in dealing with civil government; for this time technical reason has enlarged the reach of human ambition even beyond the limits which Hobbes knew.

The difficulty with this solution is that if a human community is saved from anarchy only by the imposition of preponderant power, it must fall into slavery for the sake of avoiding anarchy. If no other forms of mutuality hold a human community together, the power which does coerce it into order must inevitably be vexatious and tyrannical.

The second difficulty is that even the most tyrannical power cannot maintain order in a human community if other forces beside coercion do not hold it together. The majesty of government can never be purely the majesty of power. The majesty of government must be partially derived from the prestige of justice and the authority of the community itself. This is to say that only communities, already formed, can create government for the purpose of perfecting their order and justice. Governments cannot create communities.

The achievement of community is, in short, not a mere rational, or not primarily, a rational achievement. Forces which are more and less than reason operate in drawing men together. The moral relation between persons and communities and groups is something more than reason because the total personality, and not merely the rational faculty is involved in the adjustment of life to life. Justice between persons rests not merely upon a rational calculation of interests but upon a decent religious sense of humility among the

strong and a capacity for charity among the so-called righteous in a community. The strong must know that they are not strong in the final sense; and the righteous must know that they are not good in the ultimate sense. The charity which is the final oil for overcoming social frictions is the fruit, not of reason but of grace. Not logic but love, lies at the foundation of a human community.

But something less, as well as something more, than reason organizes human communities. They are held together because they speak a common language or have a common history or fear a common foe. The global community unfortunately lacks these sub-rational forces of social cohesion. It has only the one Thomas Hobbes observed; the fear of mutual annihilation. This lack makes it very difficult to achieve world community; and no amount of constitutional logic can supply the defect.

A recognition of this defect reveals our age to be a tragic one because we do not have unfailing logical or rational instruments for the solution of our global communal problem. We are not as completely masters of our historical destiny as modern men would like to believe. Some of the resources of living together are below and others are above, the level of rational calculation. The recognition that some of them are below that level might well strengthen the resources which are above that level. Charity, in other words, is at least partially a fruit of humility.

It is a sad fact that many Americans are more interested in a world constitution than in finding an imaginative solution for the relation of a rich America to an impoverished Europe.

They lack the humility for the solution of the latter problem. They want a world government to save us from war; but they are unwilling to make a generous loan agreement with Britain, even though it can be proved that our "generosity" is necessary from the standpoint of a wise national self-interest. They are thus irrational in their too consistent rationality. They do not understand the deeper and the higher resources of human personality with which "reason" must work if men are to achieve a tolerable justice in their relations with each other.

The Russian and American Race

Russia and America are in a race to determine which is the most stupid in wielding the power which each has won in the past years. Russia stupidly rules its part of Europe with an iron hand, operates behind a complete news blackout in eastern Europe, and secures with a bludgeon the advantages which it desires in such adjacent nations as Iran when it could have all it needed by subtler means. It allows itself to be involved in a spy plot in Canada and makes the most stupid excuse, declaring in one breath that its spies gained nothing but the knowledge published in the Smythe report, that they were dismissed because they attempted to secure this knowledge and that Canada is only trying to get even because the Soviets ran counter to Canadian policy at London. This is diplomatic stupidity at its worst.

Whatever the Hearst and McCormick press may say, the western world is desperately anxious to live at peace with Russia; but the Russians make it more and more difficult for us to find the way to peace.

We may question whether American policy is as obviously stupid. But our blunders are pretty glaring. Whether we think the Russians ought to be resisted or "appeased" we seem to blunder equally. The fact is, that our best policy lies in neither appeasement nor resistance. Our best policy would be to give Europe the chance for a healthy economic life. There is ample evidence that western Europe does not want to be dominated by Russia or communism, that it is however both poor and radical and does want something more hopeful than American "free enterprise". Our failure consists in the fact that we, as a wealthy democracy, are so afraid that Europe might adopt a more radical democratic form than our own. Thus we constantly force the disillusioned masses of Europe into Russian hands.

Some of our mistakes are not even prompted by these obvious social prejudices of ours. They are due merely to our lack of experience in bearing the tremendous imperial responsibilities which we now carry. In Germany we have no clear vision of our purpose or goal. If there is a policy it is determined by Morgenthau's fateful influence upon the German question. We blow up factories while millions of Germans lack shelter. We throw not only Nazis but quasi-collaborators in jail and make little effort to sift the sheep from the goats. Our occupation authorities are composed of both officers and men whose primary concern is to get home. It is now fairly apparent that the late General Patton, whatever his vices of exhibitionism, was really on the right track when he was dismissed from his post. He had wanted to be a little more discriminating than the Morgenthau policy permitted. He had wanted to be at

east as discriminating as the Russians and the British. But we have a "liberal" press in America which distorts every discriminating judgment toward a fallen people into proof of collaboration with Nazism.

We have not yet restored postal connection with Germany. The president has however finally yielded to the pressure of church organizations and will allow us to send food parcels to Germany. The army had prided itself upon maintaining a 1500 calory per day diet in the American zone, but neglected to tell us that you have to stay in bed if you eat as little food as that.

There are wise and good men in the state department in the American occupation and in every organism of our government who understand the situation and would act wisely if they could. But they can do little but beat their heads against stone walls.

The consequence of our policy muddle is that we are creating a political, economic and cultural vacuum in Germany and in central Europe which makes it quite impossible for a healthy nation to arise, not to speak of a healthy democracy. Meanwhile there are still American idealists who think that Germany might be saved by some copy-book version of democracy.

The Russians have at times been brutal in Germany. But they are on the whole wiser than we. We renounced the silly prohibition of fraternization only after Russian policy forced us to it. The Russians are wise enough to understand that millions of quasi-Nazi little people cannot be permanently excluded from the political and economic life of

the nation. We still exclude them. The Russians are fiercer than we with Nazi criminals. But they are less inclined to indict a whole nation. The Russian propaganda on the radio is shrewder than ours. We still think that we can "educate" the German people by preaching to them every night that they ought to feel and look as guilty as they are. Our educational program violates rules of penological rehabilitation which even backward wardens of penitentiaries have learned.

The British zone meanwhile is free of both the brutalities of the Russian zone and our stupidities. The British have gone further than anyone else in using former Nazis. They may have gone too far. But there are signs of new life and health in the British zone which are lacking in ours.

The fact is that we are missing the best chance to maintain peace in the world. That chance lies not in bargaining with Russia, in yielding to her or in threatening her. That chance lies in using our power creatively in that part of the world which is under the dominion of that power. But we have not yet proved ourselves capable of such a solution of our world problem. We had the engineering intelligence to make ourselves the most powerful military nation on earth. Industrial potential can be turned into military power. But technical intelligence cannot be transmuted into wise statesmanship. That is the root of our difficulty. Statesmanship requires a different order of wisdom. Such wisdom must be infused with many elements, not the least of which is charity. But who ever heard of charity in a technical world.

Ideology in the Social Struggle

The history of the post-war strikes in our country is instructive in that it substantiates at every point a Christian, rather than a sentimental or purely rational analysis of human behaviour.

Consider the instance the attitude of the National Manufacturers Association in the present difficulties. It has used expensive page adds to prove 1) That higher wages would lead to inflation and that increase in wages could be granted only if each individual worked more hours. 2) That price restrictions should be removed and that such a policy would not lead to inflation because it would encourage fuller production and would ultimately result in such a volume of goods that prices would come down through the operation of the law of supply and demand.

This propaganda is so palpably dishonest and so obviously leaves important data out of account that it cannot be attributed merely to ignorance. This is not merely the narrow view of a business class looking at the common good from its limited perspective. This is ideology; but something more is involved in this ideology than is generally assumed in Marxist analyses.

The National Manufacturers Association could not possibly believe that the way to prosperity and justice is as simple as it declares. There are too many well known facts, which it has ignored, to permit the assumption that faulty perspective could account for the error. There must be an element of conscious dishonesty in this approach. We are confronted with the age old sin of man, seeking to make the worse appear better reason by hiding his own

interest behind a facade of assumed concern for the common good.

The National Manufacturers Association has left both the immediate perils of inflation and the ultimate perils of deflation out of account. Chester Bowles, the head of the OPA has presented irrefutable proof of the fact that if price restrictions are removed before there is a full supply of consumer goods, the pressure of demand will force prices skyward and that such a movement can get out of hand to such a degree that it will not be stopped until a catastrophic deflationary movement stops it. The deflationary movement will ultimately set in because high prices will restrict the capacity of the consumers to absorb the goods which industry can ultimately produce.

The NMA professes not to fear the ultimate peril of deflation because it is sure that more and more production will make everyone in America wealthy. Henry J. Taylor, radio spokesman of the General Motors Corporation has given an imaginative turn to the National Manufacturers propaganda. He pictures America, hungry for consumer goods after four years of dearth; and "better tools and better ways of doing things" constantly increasing production for a constantly increasing market. Finally "American methods" will "deliver more leisure, more goods and services and improved living standards" beyond any previous dreams of avarice. All this we can have if only we stop striking or placing price restrictions upon our goods.

The trouble with this picture is that more and more production without a proper distribution of the ever-increasing wealth which the machine produces,

eventually results in overproduction and crisis. The National Manufacturers Association seems never to have heard of the periods of unemployment we have had as a result of producing more and more goods. Take the periods of 1925-29. In that period industrial production rose 27% and the productivity of labor rose 24% but wages rose only 5.8%. In the steel industry alone during that period production rose 47% and profits increased by 150%. Wages remained practically stationary, rising from 64 to 66 cents per hour. The National Manufacturers Association is certain not only that wages will rise but that prices will drop under the miracle of American production. But in the period preceding our last depression prices dropped only 1%.

The simple fact is that the owners of industry appropriated the abundance created by the modern miracle of production; and that they were so greedy about it that they ran us headlong into a depression from which we did not emerge until war production saved us. They did not allow the great consuming public enough return on their labor to buy what this public was producing. This basic problem has not been solved, though labor is now much stronger than it was twenty years ago and is determined to use its strength, while it is undiminished, to force wages up in proportion to the new level of productivity.

The propaganda of our industrial overlords is in other words not only stupid but in such flagrant contradiction to our experience that it must be regarded as dishonest as well. One might well speculate about the character of man which makes it possible for respectable citizens to defy the known

lessons of our common experience in this way in order to reap some momentary profits. Most of them would not have cheated the government in the time of war. But they are quite willing to risk the horrors of another depression for the sake of an immediate advantage.

We still find rationalists speaking wisely about the necessity of overcoming a "cultural lag" and bringing our social intelligence to the level of our scientific intelligence. But obviously something more than ignorance is involved in this stupidity which defies all the lessons of our experience. It reveals the pathetic capacity of powerful men and groups to prefer their own and their immediate interests to the wider interests of the group and their own long term interests.

Fortunately labor is powerful enough to prevent the wide hiatus between productivity and wages which resulted during the last boom period. But there is little likelihood that it will be powerful enough or that the nation will be wise enough to avoid all the evil consequences of the policy which our economic oligarchy is determined to follow.

The Mistakes of Labor

Labor is on the whole the servant of justice in the modern community because its interests are identical with the interests of the total community. Labor is in the fortunate position of contributing to the health of the community, if it is able to achieve a better distribution of the wealth of the modern machine. It must be observed however that labor can sacrifice this moral advantage by taking short cuts to its goal of higher wages. In the present strike epidemic Walter Reuther of the United

Automobile Workers was the only labor leader of great enough statesmanship to insist that some of the excessive profits of industry must go into higher wages without raising prices. He insisted that labor must protect the community against immediate inflation, even while it establishes higher wages for the purpose of avoiding ultimate deflation.

One must record regretfully that Reuther stood alone in the labor camp on this policy. The steel workers under Murray took the position that prices were none of their affair. John L. Lewis has been even more cynical and piping the tune of the manufacturers for higher prices, so long as some of the profits are used for higher wages. Such a policy produces a kind of producers conspiracy against the community, a conspiracy in which management and labor combine to win larger returns from the communal common fund, to the detriment of those classes who lack the social power to secure similar results. If uni-

versally adopted such a policy would produce wild inflation in which the middle classes would be wiped out.

It is significant that Reuther was not only isolated in the labor hierarchy but was severely criticised for his "radicalism" by many labor leaders who profess to believe that it is the business of labor to secure higher wages, without reference to wider social policy. This means that labor is also willing to buy momentary advantages at the expense of catastrophe for the community in the end. The maladjustments of modern industrial society cannot even be palliated, and certainly not cured, by a spiral of higher wages and higher prices. Our difficulties are more basic than that. If labor should consistently disavow the kind of statesmanship which looks more deeply into the malady of an industrial society, it will also contribute to our ultimate catastrophe. And it will also be guilty of more than stupidity. For the facts are plain enough.

FREEDOM—NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE

By JOHN A. HUTCHINSON

Amid the diverse definitions and conflicting interpretations, freedom may, I suggest, be tenably defined as self-determination. By self-determination I mean quite literally autonomy. The etymology of the latter word conveys the definition accurately; it supposes that there are such things as human selves which determine their action according to the instinctive laws of their own being, without let or hindrance from outside factors.

As a popular maxim has it, freedom is *freedom from* and *freedom to*; it has, in other words, its negative and its positive conditions. Negatively it means the absence of interference or hindrance. It means that nothing outside the volition or purposive activity of the self interferes with the operation, the carrying into effect, of that volition. Thus I am unfree if the action of another person overrides my volition by whatever means, physical or mental, and coerces my action. I am also unfree if my action is controlled by some physico-chemical fact of my bodily structure, or by some deeply lodged habit, or by the compulsive force of some especially immediate or vivid desire. In short, determinism in the common meaning of the term signifies just this—that the controlling factor in action lies not in the volition of the agent but outside it.

Now doctrines of universal determinism of this sort have almost uniformly been resisted by Christian thought, because theoretically they are false to the experience of selfhood and practically they lead to its frustration. Theoretically

any candid determinism is self-refuting, contains a vicious circle. For the determinist must logically assume at least enough freedom to assert his determinism, otherwise the truth value of his assertion is undermined. In other words the assertion of determinism denies the freedom essential to this or any other assertion.

Against determinism, the notion of freedom as indeterminism or the absence of determination has a kind of negative validity. It guards against reductive determinism and permits the assertion of spontaneity as a genuine and irreducible experience of the self. This does not necessarily, of course, mean indeterminism in physical nature, as for example in the quantum jump of electrons. Electrons may or may not be always determined in their behavior; that is a matter for the physicists to decide. But it is altogether necessary for us to assume that human selves are not always so determined. Freedom thus means here at least the absence of rigid causal determinism.

But freedom means also the absence of social obstacles and hindrances. So it has recently been defined by Dorothy Fosdick in her book, *What Is Liberty?*, as a "demand for conditions under which one is not prevented from doing what one has desire, competence and means to do." In a similar vein Harold Laski has written in *Freedom in the Modern State*, "I mean by liberty the absence of restraint upon the existence of those social conditions in modern

civilization which are the necessary guarantees of individual happiness."

But freedom has also its positive conditions. It is interesting to quote Laski also in this connection. In the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* he writes, "Liberty may be defined as the affirmation by an individual or group of his or its own essence. It seeks in the first place a certain harmonious balance of personality . . . and it demands . . . the organization of the opportunities for the exercise of a continuous initiative." The occurrence of freedom thus calls positively for the existence of selves of a sufficient degree of integration to possess volition or purpose, and for the internal and external means whereby those volitions may be made effective in action. Thus freedom is an irrelevant word for newborn babies, or for human beings in whom mental disease has disintegrated personality. Freedom means the presence of requisite material means. The cripple is thus not free to move his paralyzed limb, however much he may desire or will it. The penniless man is not free to buy food or clothes. The unemployed man is not free to work. Freedom in such contexts means being able, having the appropriate means to do what one wants to do. Again, freedom involves knowledge. In a scientific laboratory a man ignorant of science is in bondage, while knowledge liberates him to do what he wishes to do.

It is important to indicate at this point that we have not been seeking in strict logic to define freedom, but rather only to indicate some of its necessary conditions. (By definition, I mean a statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing's occurrence.) For freedom logically is, as Robert MacIver

has pointed out, an indefinable, a logical primitive, a datum of immediate apprehension. If one desires to see what it is, let him look within himself as he says, "I will" or "I want," and let him watch himself as he sets about to secure the object of his desire. It can no more be defined than a color or any quality; we may simply point to it and describe some of the objective conditions necessary for its occurrence. It is an aspect of human selfhood or personality; to be a self involves in some sense and at some point to be free. Or to state the negative, to be completely in bondage is to deny selfhood both theoretically and practically. The last statement is of urgent moral significance for it means that the denial of freedom is virtually the denial of the right to be a human personality.

In connection with this analysis of freedom as logically primitive aspect of selfhood, it is interesting to point out a subtle error in the philosophies which equate freedom with self-realization. Laski's definition of freedom as "the affirmation of any individual or group of his or its essence" may stand as an example. If the preceding paragraph is correct, freedom is not that process of self-affirmation or self-realization, but is a mode of being which makes that process possible. Only as we are free is self-fulfilment or realization possible. Likewise, a course of action which tends to thwart or deny selfhood tends also to deny or thwart the freedom which is so closely and constantly related to the very being of the self. But freedom and self-realization are not the same thing.

But if freedom be, as we have defined it, self-determination, or the determination of action by human selves, we must look to the meaning of selfhood. What

is a self or personality? It is a bundle of purposes, a system of volitions organized into a harmonious unity by reflection and self-awareness. The precise amount of unity, or integration, and of reflection and of self-awareness vary widely, and it is extremely difficult to assign the minimum necessary for the occurrence of personality. At least it is true to say that when these elements are absent personality does not occur.

Reflection and self-awareness open our eyes to the experience of choice and to objects of choice which we call good and bad. This experience is, at least at times, metaphysically real, not to be undercut or explained away by any kind of reductive determinism. It is an ultimate metaphysical fact that selves sometimes stand at crossroads where two or more courses of action are open—really open—to them. Here we may see the genuine relevance of the notion of freedom as indeterminacy or spontaneity.

But in the experience of choice the self freely affirms and commits itself to an end or goal deemed good. Thereafter its action is not undetermined but determined by the goal or end which is pursued. It is, of course, of great importance to distinguish between this kind of determination and physical or causal determination, for they are quite different things. The one common factor is that in both cases one event in some way controls the occurrence of another event. Beyond that point the similarity ceases; for in the one case human consciousness and unforced choice are irreducible factors, and in the other case there is no evidence of these factors. In the one case the cause or controlling event is a future goal or objective which is envisaged in imagina-

tion and affirmed in an unforced act of choice; in the other case the controlling event generally precedes its effect, and the only relation open to empirical observation is their unvarying occurrence together.

The experience of committing oneself to an end deemed good and having one's actions determined thereby has by William Temple been called spiritual determination, which Temple gives as his definition of freedom. The concept is a suggestive one for it throws light on a seeming paradox. It is a frequent testimony that one is most free when he is most determined by the values to which he is committed. The religious person says, "Make me a captive, Lord, then I shall be free." The self is thus never sheer spontaneity; it achieves a certain enduring unity and stability from the values about which it is organized. Its actions thus achieve a certain amount of predictability. A self which has been determined by certain values in the past will tend to do so in the future, not only from the force of habit but because of the enduring organization of the self about the values to which it is committed. This determinism of character, as it has been called is not hostile but altogether consistent with freedom as we have described it. Of course it is true that the commitment to some objects of choice does not liberate and fulfil human selfhood, rather it produces abject bondage. Indeed it is not too much to say that the prime moral problem of human selfhood is to find goals or objects of choice, the pursuit of which liberates and not enslaves human personality.

This question brings us to one further question about the self and its values.

Is it true, as claimed by certain behaviorist psychologists and advertising men, that given appropriate stimuli, human nature can be conditioned in any way whatever? Or are there some values inherent in the nature of personality which tend always to promote certain responses and inhibit others? Is personality so much putty in the hand of the environment to be moulded to whatever shape the stimulus requires, or does personality have a structure and nature of its own, that will in some sense express itself everywhere and always? Are there some values given in the very nature of personality itself, so that to affirm them is to become a person, and to deny them is to stultify personality? In reply, we must urge that we cannot satisfactorily define personality apart from its end or goal. We cannot define what we are apart from what we ought to do, for what we are is in some part determined by what we ought to be. Personality is, among other things, an embodiment of ideal values. What these values are, is properly an existential question, the answer to which conveys the answerer's faith in what human life and personality are all about. Many of us will want to say that two such ideal values which virtually define the nature of life for us are reason and love or brotherhood. By which we mean that to be a person means to grow in wisdom and in love, and that conversely to act unreasonably and hatefully is to deny one's being as a person—in the end to be not a man but anti-man. To be sure, none of us is a person in the full sense of these words. We are rather personalities in the making. But our partial achievement is to be measured by these norms.

II

Let us turn from this analysis of freedom as an aspect of human selfhood to consider briefly the positive and negative conditions of freedom in present day society. Social philosophers may be distinguished according to their positive or negative definitions of freedom. For example, the definition of freedom given by the British empiricists, by French physiocrats, and by laissez-faire economists from Adam Smith to Herbert Hoover and Frederick Hayek, has emphasized the negative conditions of freedom. Freedom is defined as the absence of interference. To see the real force and validity of this definition we must analyze the cultural situation in which it arose. Once more, the conditions of freedom are the occurrence of human selves of a degree of harmonious integration, together with the presence of the requisite means and the absence of hindrances for the effective expression of the purposes of those selves. How were these conditions met by the culture which first defined freedom as the absence of interference? This concept was, of course, the fighting faith of an emerging middle class struggling alike against feudal restrictions and the hindrances of absolute monarchs. Now this middle class had come out of philosophical and religious tradition which placed a high value on human selfhood. For these and for other reasons, historically too complex for analysis here, the early middle class produced real personalities of a very high degree of integration. They had at hand moreover the requisite material means for the effectuation of their purposes. The one thing which stood in the way of the operation of those purposes was the hindrances noted above. It was thus en-

irely natural for them, focussing attention on the problem at hand, to define freedom as the absence of such interference.

Thus arose the notion that freedom is to be identified invariably with a particular set of economic and political institutions—the System of Liberty—as Herbert Hoover has expressed it, by which he means freedom of enterprise, competition, government as a policeman (withal a policeman amiably disposed toward the entrepreneur), and democracy as a sort of Siamese twin of the kind of economic liberty thus described. In a given historical situation this combination of ideas made sense. Proclaimed as eternal truth for every time and place, their truth is not so obvious. For men's selves and purposes change from age to age, and likewise the material and human conditions for the operation of those purposes. Thus if a case is to be made for these ideas today, it is incumbent upon their proponents to show by specific factual analysis of our situation how their recommended organization of our social energies will liberate and effectuate human purposes in our situation. Yet this kind of specific factual analysis is seldom forthcoming. The case rather takes the form of a trident proclamation of alleged eternal truth. Perhaps this is the case because people who analyze present day economic and political institutions in specific detail with fair and open minds do often come out with other conclusions and other proposals.

It is further incumbent upon the proponents of laissez-faire to analyze for us the question—*Whose liberty to do what?* For to organize society to liberate and effectuate the volitions of some men for

some activities inevitably brings restraints to other men and other activities. One man's freedom is another man's bondage. Only concrete factual analysis of specific cultural situations can throw light on such problems as these—not a priori dogmas about Liberty of the System of Liberty.

If now we turn from economic liberty to the other individual liberties such as speech and press, assembly and worship, as those rights have been fought out and won in the modern world, we find a similar case. In the mediaeval culture individual men lived in bondage, though the philosophic and religious foundations of significant human selfhood were there laid. Men had important things to say and do and they were restrained from saying and doing those things. It was natural for them to say that to be rid of those chains, to be emancipated, is to be free. And in every age to be rid of chains is a necessary condition of freedom; but as we are learning, it is not a sufficient condition of freedom.

Positive definitions of freedom are harder to characterize or to analyze socially. Sometimes they have been radical, as in Laski; sometimes reactionary, as in Hegel. Sometimes they have been highly rational, sometimes utterly irrational. Hegel, for example, regarded freedom as self-realization through unity with the absolute or universal will as embodied in the Prussian state, which, as Bertrand Russell has recently remarked, makes liberty the divine right to obey the policeman. But it is to be noted that British liberals and radicals took this seemingly reactionary concept and made it serve the uses of social reform. Behind the reactionary facade they saw a deeply social

concept, in contrast to the individualistic concept of laissez-faire; and among the positive conditions of freedom they looked more to the economic than to the purely political means.

In her generally excellent treatment of freedom Miss Fosdick is severely critical of thinkers who emphasize the positive rather than the negative aspects of freedom in terms of which she formulates her definition. Such positive factors taken alone do not, she argues, guarantee the occurrence of freedom. Freedom is something other and something more than simply the coincidence of these factors. That is entirely correct. But the occurrence of the positive factors bears, in strict logic, exactly the same relation to freedom as does the absence of the hindrances or negative factors. Both are necessary but not sufficient conditions, by which we mean that if the positive means be absent or if the hindrances be present, freedom does not take place. The logical relation is exactly the same; sometimes the contingencies of history emphasize one set of factors and sometimes the other. What makes Miss Fosdick's insistence so untimely is that the present hour in history seems so loudly to call for a positive and not just a negative conception of freedom.

To be sure, some people—too tragically many people—are still in chains, and for them negative freedom, freedom from, still has a decisive and poignant meaning. But for the masses of people in the western world that is not the problem. We are rid of our chains, but still we do not seem to be genuinely free. The positive conditions of freedom are, once more, the occurrence of

human selves harmoniously integrated, together with the inner and outer means for the effective operation of their volitions or purposes. As to the first condition, to be free men, we must first be men; we must achieve and maintain something of our stature as rational and spiritual beings. How do we stand on this count? The emancipation of modern man from the bonds of mediaeval society has gone so far that the individual is left lonely in the midst of a vast world which has little meaning or purpose. Again, the processes of modern industry have introduced so much mechanization and standardization that the individual life has become just what certain psychologists have called it, a bundle of impulses and habits without any spontaneity or any integrated purpose. In a situation like this, negative freedom becomes an intolerable burden, and men seek as Eric Fromm has reminded us, to escape from freedom. They flee atavistically back into conformity or submission. And so they cease in any intelligible sense of the word to be persons.

In such a situation what is imperatively needed is not more negative freedom, but a fresh analysis of its positive conditions for our time and place. Among these conditions may be listed the following: (1) A philosophy of life and society which makes human selfhood a meaningful and a desirable thing. It is my conviction that only some form of Christian theism can do this, though to argue this point would take us beyond the bounds set for this paper. (2) A reorganization of the material means of life so that the volitions of countless men are no longer thwarted

by the lack of daily bread and daily work. As Laski has put it, liberty will never be achieved apart from the achievement of equality. (3) A sense of community which will overcome the present loneliness of the individual and give him the realization that he is part—an essential part—of an enduring and

over-arching purpose of a personal community of free men. Only if these things are achieved will freedom continue to be a good and meaningful thing to the men of our time and place. Lacking these things it will be an empty word—an empty word which will serve as the preface to new forms of tyranny.

THE INADEQUACY OF MODERN PACIFISM

By FRANKLIN H. LITTELL

The war years have brought forth a measure of searching in the pacifist groups which is not without significance to Protestantism as a whole. For personal reasons I have felt unfree to bring direct and public criticism "for the duration"; I may now state unequivocally the reasons for my present conviction that modern pacifism is "the wrong way to meet the right problem". That problem is WAR. Any point of view which deals responsibly with this most major contemporary problem must be judged in terms of the effectiveness of its line of action.

For some time pacifists have been sensitive to a lack of discipline in their ranks. This lack makes for a large feeling of frustration in confronting practical decisions, a feeling especially marked in the Civilian Public Service units. There is a great deal of discussion of the reasons for this incoherence, and this article has served as a basis for discussion in a number of groups in the last four years—Civilian Public Service, Fellowship of Reconciliation and "exploratory", and is an effort to get at the sources of the predicament in which some of our most idealistic youth have found themselves.

To get at the problem of effective discipline for action larger questions of policy must be raised; history can be searched with profit to find the origins of intellectual and tactful conflict within the pacifist groups. If we except Jehovah's Witnesses from our council

(as, indeed, they except themselves),¹ we may concern ourselves with three main groupings: the non-resistant tradition, the revolutionary tradition of non-violent direct action, and modern pacifism.

The Non-Resistant Tradition

The historic peace churches (Mennonites, Brethren, Friends) carry the non-resistant witness. This is not pacifism in the modern sense at all. Stemming from the Left Wing of the Reformation,² their central emphasis is upon a recovery of the pure Christianity of the Church "before the Fall". This is to me accomplished in part by heightening the tension between the restored brotherhood-community of *Acts* and the Sermon on the Mount, and the world of corruption and compromise. Of all compromise, the most infamous was the union of Church and State under Constantine. They proposed to go back to the Church "before the Fall", when faith was true and inward and uncoerced. To enforce the high ethical requirements for the True Church the Ban was used without fear or favor—a notable example being when the Rhode Island Friends after repeated visitation in 1774 expelled from their number the most important public figure in the colony. Stephen Hopkins, for refusal to free a slave.

¹ Stroup, Herbert Hewitt. *The Jehovah's Witnesses* (Columbia University Press, 1945). N. Y. p. 126.

² Bainton, Roland H., "The Left Wing of the Reformation", XXI *The Journal of Religion* (1941) 2:124-34.

Being Scriptural in attitude to the world, the peace churches don't expect much of it. They do not take their position in terms of social strategy. As a great Mennonite historian has put it, "the world is to be overcome . . . not assimilated".³ The American Friends absorbed more of New World optimism, and participate more fully in the functions of government; but this has been a provisional participation. In 1756 the Quaker members of the Pennsylvania assembly resigned rather than participate in war measures contrary to their peace testimony. But they resigned rather than vote against them, recognizing that for the colony there was no real alternative, and that a stout resistance to Indian depredations was a kind of "secondary good" which might be respected as such.⁴ In this context the Christian was to refuse to participate in war not because the nations might reasonably be expected to live by "the counsels of perfection", but rather because warring was inconsistent with the Calling of a Christian. A revolutionary position was at all times to be avoided; it was a duty to pay taxes, pray for the "Magistrate", and avoid rebellious activity. Government is given by God for the ordering of this sinful world, and an imperfect government is to be borne as a sign of God's chastening.

In such negative interpretation, the only large requirement of good government is toleration. The Anabaptists, the Continental forerunners of the peace

churches, knew only two types of government: 1) that which persecuted ("Anti-Christ"); 2) that which tolerated (but which, they warned each other, might break into persecution at any time). Their descendents in the New World have largely escaped persecution, but when it has come they have faced it with fortitude and faith, and without surprise. They know that is the kind of a world to live in. In the light of this history it is plain that the C. P. C. program is *correlative with the historic peace church position*.⁵ It represents in fact the commitment of a tolerating government to non-persecution of the non-resistant communities; it represents, on the other hand, the commitment of the peace churches to avoid rebellious activity and political opposition.

Non-Violent Direct Action

Revolutionary pacifism is best represented in modern times by the type of political action which Gandhi's leadership has brought into the India National Congress. Here non-violence is a form of social coercion, and has "more in common with war than with Western pacifism".⁶ The historical struggle is accepted, the party deals in terms of power; non-violent direct action goes into the arena of public affairs to justify itself in competition with other possible strategies. Those who use this weapon are fighting to win.

There is also a long tradition in the international revolutionary movements which is represented by the slogan, "the

³ Horsch, John, *The Hutterian Brethren*, 1528-1931 (Mennonite Historical Society, 1931). Goshen, Ind. Footnote 128, p. 134.

⁴ The sharpening of issues during war brings out the essentially *vocational* character of the peace church position, and establishes the affinity between the three churches in spite of some conflict in detail. The whole matter is admirably treated by D. Elton Trueblood in "The Quaker Way". 166 *The Atlantic Monthly* (December, 1940) 6:740-46.

⁵ They believed. . . . that the C. P. S. plan as adopted was the best solution under conscription which they could find." Hershberger, Guy F., *War, Peace and Nonresistance* (The Herald Press, 1945), Scottdale Penna. Chapter XII.

⁶ Shridharani, Krishnalal, *War Without Violence* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939). N. Y. First edition. p. xxx.

more violence, the less revolution".⁷ Men of this accent have studied to develop those strategies of working class organization which paralyze the enemy by disciplined non-violence: organized boycott, sit-down strike, general strike, refusal to pay taxes or accept military service.⁸ The ultimate end is to destroy the General Will which supports the class in power and to erect a substitute government. As a revolutionary technique it is associated usually with the struggle of unarmed colonial peoples, and more recently with the Resistance on the Continent of Europe. Americans may be interested to note that at the end of our own colonial period one of the most successful boycotts in history was organized by the Committees of Correspondence; in four years' time, 1771-75, they reduced trade between England and her American colonies from more than \$4,200,000 to less than \$200,000 value.

Non-Violent Direct Action requires careful discipline and strategic thinking. It is aimed at an enemy or it is directed to a limited objective. The view of history is hopeful, and the use of power is affirmed.

Modern Pacifism

The pacifism which finds expression in such bodies as the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the various denominational pacifist societies derives largely from professed religious principle. Yet the modernists depart from the historic peace churches at several significant points. A sharp view will suggest that

there are several major incoherences in modern pacifism which reflect the secularization of Christian thinking rather than any maturation of Christian philosophy. Due to these confusions it has proved impossible to define any effective pattern of discipline; modern pacifists cannot go beyond the loose association of a study club or fellowship group, until certain inherent frustrations are resolved. These frustrations are due to theoretical deficiencies at certain fundamental points: they are inherent in modern pacifism and not accidental.

Modern pacifism represents an unsound view of the world, of history and of human nature. Although it largely claims to stand upon the shoulders of the historic peace churches, its reasoning actually represents a serious departure from the Biblical position. The Anabaptists saw the world was hostile to the Gospel and expected no great good from "the princes and powers of this world's darkness". The Friends, although less pessimistic concerning history than their brethren of Continental origin, do not fall into any shallow optimism.⁹ Their most prominent public figures—such as John Bright and John Greenleaf Whittier—have not failed to appreciate the difficulties in making a real choice in public policy. Like other Christians, they expect a higher standard of life of their own community than they anticipate in the world at large; but the Sermon on the Mount applies to the Christian Calling in a direct fashion not parallel to the relations between nations. "For this is the Judgment, that the light is come into the world and men loved darkness rather than the Light." (*John*

⁷ deLigt, Bart., *The Conquest of Violence* (E. P. Dutton & Co., 1938), N. Y. p. x.

⁸ In addition to deLigt note Case, Clarence Marsh *Non-Violent Coercion* (G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923), London.

⁹ Yarrow, Clarence H., "Should the Pacifists Expect Success?", 102 *Friends Intelligencer* (9/1/45) 35:555-56.

3:19.) As truly as the world crucified the Best Man, the path which He walked leads to Golgotha's Hill.

In contrast to the historic peace churches, modern pacifism has taken over from secular philosophies a great optimism concerning the world. The world is fundamentally good, and real surprise and dismay is shown when the self-destructive and demonic make their appearance. Because they do not have the heart to believe the evil of which men and nations are capable, modern pacifists do not take the Cross seriously. The opposition or scorn encountered is not considered part of the permanent warfare between the world and the Kingdom; rather it is hoped that all men will be won through patience to the New Way, and the fundamental character of social life will be changed. The type of theological wandering involved is strikingly shown in a recent volume widely circulated by the F. O. R.—*Into the Way of Peace*. After a splendid exposition of the religious grounds for walking the Way of Suffering Love, the author concludes.

"We who call ourselves pacifists and try to be Christians, have faith in the fundamental sanity and goodness of ordinary people in all countries . . ." ¹⁰

This is, of course, another point altogether; and the implication is Utopian rather than Biblical. The Cross turns out to be not crucifixion after all, but a modern success story!

Modern pacifists share with other liberal Christians a naive faith in social progress through "education". Biblical and Marxist philosophies are agreed that

history is carried by select peoples.¹¹ This stands in fundamental opposition to the common assumption that great causes are effected and history moved by the enthusiastic and broadcast preaching of discarnate ideas. The next generation is to be saved by the teaching that men ought to cooperate and that nations should be reconciled one to the other.

Such confidence in the spreading of right ideas is a fault of others besides pacifists, although shared by them, and is shown in such an instance as the current phrasing about "building the mind that will guarantee a just and durable peace". It is frequently said that the unique thing about this World War as against the First World War is that in this case "people" are discussing seriously the question of permanent peace. This might be encouraging, but unfortunately history does not document such assumptions. In the previous World War conferences were held all over the United States to "win the war for Permanent Peace"; by May, 1918, this movement was organized in 45 states with more than 4000 state and county officers and committeemen. In England the Union of Democratic Control was organized, with a very large following and powerful leadership including some of the top Labour men. In France there was a Central Organization for a Durable Peace, an Association de la Paix par le Droit, and numerous League of Nations societies. In the three countries mentioned these movements, with slogans and purposes remarkably parallel to those of today, had a following numbering millions and very considerable

¹⁰ Hartill, Percy, ed., *Into the Way of Peace* (Fellowship Publications 1943), N. Y. Chapter I.

¹¹ Tillich, Paul, "Marxism and Christian Socialism", 6 *Christianity and Society* (1941) 13-18, 14.

budgets and paid staffs.¹² These educational associations were as powerful as anything at the present time, and yet they did not dot a single *i* nor cross a single *t* in the peace treaty! The reason is that like the present groups engaged in such discussions regarding the peace, they never took seriously the question of how to get what they wanted. Instead of developing a theory of the road to power, they contented themselves with the multiplying of blue-prints.

Power is the issue in politics, and groups that want to affect international history intentionally must take it seriously. Social man does not live in a world of pure idea; he is too busy swimming against the current to spare the wind. If peace groups want to affect major policy they must descend from the realm of pure idea and deal with questions of strategy and power. *They must above all learn to distinguish between what they expect of their own members and what they expect of the world at large.* So far modern pacifism has not made this distinction, and has shown a painful inability to bring things to pass. It has failed to create a genuine historical alternative to war for peace-loving peoples.

Modern pacifism has been unable to attain an effective discipline within its own ranks. Since it hesitates to deal with historic forces which compete for existence, modern pacifism expects a harmony of forces within society. The Doctrine of the Incarnation, of "the word made flesh", is not taken seriously. Such pacifism fears the corruption of absolute principle as soon as it becomes incarnate, struggling for existence in a

world that loves it not. This is true, that principles do become corrupted as soon as they become identified with a given historical group and its struggles. But it is also true that history is carried by select groups, minorities that know what they want and harness flesh and blood in the achieving of it. The greatest act of human genius is not to maintain an unsullied and abstract pure principle against all challengers; it is rather to create—an imperfect form—an earthy approximation of the vision held. This is the agony of coming to birth, which no living thing can avoid.

At present it is impossible to get a genuine "sense of the meeting" among modern pacifists, and fellowship is all too frequently at the amiable level of avoiding serious questions rather than running the risk of basic consideration and binding decision. *Modern pacifism is a frame of mind, not a movement.* It is in part the desire of individuals to keep clean of a dirty business, and in part a general revolt against "authoritarianism"—including the authority of group decision democratically made!

This introduces the final frustration of modern pacifism: *the inability to develop a coherent and planned program of action.* In part this is because it is undecided whether it wants to be the New Church of the Non-Violent Covenant, or the New Party of the Non-Violent Revolution. But more largely it is being victimized by a notion of pure conscience, the results of which are as chaotic as the doctrine is unsound. All too frequently actions involving the whole fellowship are launched by an individual or small coterie, who act without making any responsible effort to consider the effect on the rest of the

¹² Hemleben, Sylvester John, *Plans for World Peace Through Six Centuries* (U. of Chicago Press, 1943), Chicago. pp. 147f.

ellowship or its program; the only reason given is that it is a matter of individual conscience. Somehow it is considered unworthy and "worldly" to raise any questions of strategy. But this is not true conscience, for conscience operates with due regard to one's fellows and the honor of God; it is, in fact, pure inspirationism.¹³

A less virulent form of individualism is in the historic Anarchist position: the idea that "organized good will is the pacifist alternative to organized violence". This at least has the merit of thinking in terms of *organized* Good Will! But it leads directly to the anarchist position: that organized Good Will is capable of sustaining the fabric of government. Too often modern pacifism allies itself with various broadsides against government on actions where the political authorities have no alternative—calling them "arbitrary", "authoritarian", "dictatorial". It has joined at times with the most crude form of political heckling, not offering a reasonable alternative, but operating on the general principle that any institution is big and unwieldy as the national government must be acting in the wrong.

Thus modern pacifism is frequently anarchist in political theory, and almost always extremely individualistic in practice. Great difficulty has been encountered in developing a coherent program and tactic in the C. P. S. units, and the lack of bindingness places such pacifism as a form of individual sentiment organized only in educational associations of free character. Apparently, no self-

discipline can be created, and yet the more general social controls in a war crisis are freely repudiated.

Conclusions

We are forced to the conclusion that, compared with both religious and revolutionary types, modern pacifism is an inadequate philosophy for action. It lies in the middle ground, frustrated by its false assumptions: it misunderstands the world, it fails to grasp human nature, it cannot bring its ideas into being, it represents anarchy rather than an alternative ordering of men's lives. Both the historic peace church position and the revolutionary philosophy, on the other hand, take history seriously. Both realize the hostility of the world to their respective lines of attack, both recognize the function of a select group, both maintain strong disciplines to have a maximum impact according to their basic commitments.

We come to the parting of the ways. For those who will yet use the word "pacifist" there are paths open, but modern pacifism is a dead-end street. According to religious persuasion or economic analysis some who have come this far will embrace Biblical non-resistance or revolutionary non-violent direct action. No one can do both. If he is able to accept the limitations of either religious or revolutionary calling, such a pacifist will find his position has discipline and intellectual integrity; modern pacifism has neither.

Modern pacifism, failing in both ideology and practice, will yield the field to more coherent and effective centers of discipline.

¹³ Field, G. C., *Pacifism and Conscientious Objection* (University Press 1945), Cambridge, England. p. 54f.

A THEOLOGY FOR THE JEWISH QUESTION

By ARTHUR ROY ECKARDT

The categories of religious absolutism and religious relativism may be of use in reflecting upon the Jewish question today, particularly as there are implications derivable therefrom for the philosophy of the Christian mission to the Jews, the problem of anti-Semitism, and the current controversy over Zionism.

On the one hand there is extreme religious absolutism, a view which equates a given historical reality with ultimate truth. Roman Catholicism belongs in this category. In their book, *Catholic Principles in Politics*, Ryan and Boland make it plain that their faith will be tolerant of other religions only while it is in the minority; the attainment of a majority must in effect mean the suppression of other faiths, since the latter do not subscribe to the truth. A similar contention, and one which is especially applicable in the present context, is made in an article by Father Arthur Riley (*The Catholic Mind*, Jan., 1945), in which the author frankly states that the position of the Roman Catholic Church

with regard to the Jews has been and still is that the Jewish religion, as existing, represents the direct antithesis and contradiction of Catholicism. For that reason and for that reason alone She has striven to preserve Catholics from such contact with Jews as might cause harm to the purity of their Catholic faith.

Further,

instances of anti-Semitism must be judged from the end sought or attained. Radical

anti-Semitism which would eliminate Jews or seeks to exclude them by death or expulsion, which denies them a part in society because of their race alone is one thing—a thing incidentally which has been vehemently condemned by Pope Pius XI. Such anti-Semitism is based on hatred. The opposition to religious tenets which are the direct antithesis of Christian principles and which seeks neither exclusion nor death is quite another.

While the latter statement may appear to mitigate somewhat the severity of the former, it nevertheless preserves the justification of religious anti-Semitism. Father Riley implies that the attitude of the Catholic Church today regarding the Jews is the same as it was in medieval times. In the Middle Ages the Jew was told that he was “an alien in a completely Christian framework”, that if he were to stay in the Christian community it would be “on our terms”, and that if he felt that his cultural development was thereby impeded, he could “either be baptized or leave.”

The implications of this view are obvious. Should Catholicism gain control in America, for example, the Jew who refuses to be baptized will be forced to leave the country. The question immediately arises whether such a situation would really be different in kind from that of the Jews in Germany under the Nazis. Enforced migration of the Jews is certainly an aspect of anti-Semitism.

One of the characteristics of paganism is its absolutizing of a given historical reality. In the religion of Nazism the

destruction not only of Judaism as a religion but of individual Jews was the inevitable result of the conflict between pagan absolutism of blood, nation and soil and a faith which at least in principle testifies to a God who transcends such historical restrictions. If Nazi absolutism is replaced by the absolutism of the Church it is difficult to see how the same result will not follow.

Even Emil Brunner, who sees the "pure Gospel" proclaimed in neither the Roman Catholic nor the Protestant churches (*The Divine Imperative*, p. 13), and who is in general a critic of religious absolutism, maintains in his little book, *Die Christusbotschaft im Kampf mit den Religionen*, that non-Christian religions have an "either-or" relation to the Christian faith, and that since Christianity admits the possibility of equality the foundation for missions is destroyed.

Jesus Christ is either the Saviour of the world, or He is not the Saviour, and simply one among many great religious geniuses, saints and prophets of the religious history of mankind, and moreover, one who has previously deceived himself regarding his real significance. If the Christian faith is a faith in Jesus, the only-begotten Son of God, in whose life and suffering, death and resurrection is involved the salvation of the world . . . (a) relativistic interpretation of the relation between the Gospel and non-Christian religions itself stands in an either-or relation to the Christian faith. (*Ibid.*, p. 3.)

On the other hand there is extreme religious relativism of the type held by Professor H. Richard Niebuhr. His is a confessional point of view which sees that "the great source of evil in life is the absolutizing of the relative, which Christianity takes the form of substituting religion, revelation, church or

Christian morality for God" (*The Meaning of Revelation*, pp. viii, ix). Such a theology must not undertake "to prove the superiority of Christian faith to all other faiths" (p. 18), and more specifically it sees in an assertion of preëminence over Judaism the sin of pride (p. 89).

While this position does involve a theological foundation for the fight against "Christian" anti-Semitism—hatred of the Jews may be interpreted as an example of the sin of idolatry, of setting up one's religion or oneself as God—will not such a view lead to the negation of the Christian missionary enterprise?

This is the dilemma in which the Christian finds himself as he contemplates his brothers, the Jews. In his acceptance of "Jesus as the Christ" he feels himself in possession of the truth, or better, grasped by the truth. But the example of Martin Luther, extreme though it is, may rise to give him pause. Incensed over the fact that they did not accept Christ and become Protestants after the Roman distortion of Christianity had been challenged and partly destroyed, the reformer engaged in most bitter tirades against the Jews (see, e.g., *Of the Jews and Their Lies*, 1543), which, incidentally, were eagerly seized upon four hundred years later by the anti-Semites of the German Christian movement in order to strengthen their position.

The Christian may feel the logic in the contention of the International Missionary Council's Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews that a true acceptance of Christ must involve a willingness to "share" Him with the people from whom He came "as of the

flesh". But at the same time the Christian recognizes the validity in the objection that conversion of the Jew usually involves not simply his acknowledgment of Christ but inclusion in the visible Christian Church, an institution which like all historical phenomena stands under the judgment of God.

In the light of a distinction between conversion to Christ and conversion to Christianity we have the genesis of a view which attempts to draw from the insights of both religious absolutism and religious relativism. My acceptance of Christ as the truth may have its fulfillment in a desire that the kin of Christ "as of the flesh" share my conviction. But I will be wary in my zeal lest I carelessly equate that truth with Christianity, a religion which participates in all the sinful relativities of history.

One may construct a scale showing the distinction that is here made. The Christian faith means loyalty to Christ as the transcendent Truth who stands above the relativities of history. But this Truth is embodied for us in that religious tradition called Christianity, which is not similarly beyond the judgment of God. Lower on the scale one may distinguish "Christendom", a religious culture of an even more syncretistic character than Christianity, and beyond that western "civilization" as such, still more syncretistic and further separated from the transcendent Truth of Christ.

The Christian will see the profound truth in the suggestion of Professor Niebuhr that our primary concern (as we look at ourselves as well as at the Jews) is conversion to God and not conversion to Christianity or to Judaism. It is our faith that such reconciliation ultimately takes place through Jesus

Christ (2 Corinthians 5:18), be we Jew or Gentile. But we will be cautious in our testimony, recognizing the judgment of God not only upon the Christian religion but upon our missionary zeal, a zeal which may easily involve a subtle form of self-exaltation because *we* have met the Truth in Christ while the Jews have not done so.

To return to the problem of anti-Semitism: The heroic resistance of the Dutch Church to the Nazi legislation against the Jews of Holland in 1940 and 1941 affords an example of how a theology which draws upon both religious relativism and religious absolutism may issue in a strong opposition to hatred of the Jews. The following excerpt from a statement of a high Christian official of the Hague, made in September of 1940 and quoted by W. A. Visser't Hooft (editor, *The Struggle of the Dutch Church*), is a poignant expression of a view which precisely because of its absolutist foundation denounces anti-Semitism:

The fact that the Jewish people is declared to be inferior contradicts the Word of God, for it has pleased God, in His marvelous and unfathomable mercy, to give redemption to all peoples and races through Jesus Christ who came from the midst of the Jewish people. Every rejection of the Jewish people is therefore a rejection of Jesus Christ.

Here, opposition to anti-Semitism might conceivably have been lacking were it not for an absolute loyalty to the Christ who is the Saviour of all men. Incidentally, the attitude of this man—as well as that of Barthian theology in general, which forms the background for his statement (cf. Karl Barth, *The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day*, pp. 49 ff.)—is an excellent refutation of

the liberal notion that one of the causes of religious intolerance and its accompanying hatreds is that of refusing to admit that all religions are equal!

Yet in addition to this absolutist stress, running through all the documents issued by the Dutch Church against the Nazis there is a deep confession of the sins of the people and of their Church. Is not the testimony of these valiant Christians an illustration of the truth that a really profound opposition to hatred of the Jews has its basis in the dialectic of absolutism (acceptance of Christ as the only Truth) and of relativism (confession of one's own sins)? Can a Church which on the theoretical side denies the relative aspect of its existence in its claim to *possess* this Truth and in the practical realm speaks in terms of the either-or of baptism and exclusion—can such a Church consistently oppose anti-Semitism? In addition, is it possible to fight effectively against this terrible evil so long as we confine ourselves to the view that anti-Semitism is simply the result of a lack of proper education, while we ignore the problem of sin? And hence can we, speaking from the standpoint of the Christian faith, explain hatred of the Jews simply in economic or psychological or sociological terms? Must we not seek a deeper meaning, a theological meaning? May not anti-Semitism, as Chaplain Fred Denbaux has suggested in a recent article (*Christianity and Society*, Fall, 1945), be at base an example of our revolt against the sovereignty of God?

Finally, our two categories may be used to throw light upon the problem of Zionism. If it is true that, as Professor Tillich has said, one of the func-

tions of (homeless) Judaism is to testify to the universal God of history as over against loyalty to a pagan god of space, the latter being a distortion to which Christianity is liable to fall prey because of the Church's acceptance by the world in national and communal life, then we have what would appear to be an argument against Zionism. On the other hand the question arises whether to refuse the Jews a homeland is to ask them to be a church, thereby, as Professor Reinhold Niebuhr puts it (Introduction to *The Jew in Our Day*, by Waldo Frank, p. 10), underestimating "their purely mundane problem of existing as a people." Of the "two dimensions of history", necessity and freedom, the former cannot be completely excluded for the sake of the latter. The relative nature of historical life militates against absolute requirements. And cannot a people seek to fulfill its universalist function through the conversion of its national foundation?

But if absolute claims within history are at variance with the Christian faith we must deny that the Jews—or the Arabs, for that matter—have an exclusive right to any particular land. Hence a decision concerning Palestine must be made, in part at least, on the basis of the *relatively* greater need of the Jews in the immediate historical situation as compared with the need of the Arabs.

It is hoped that the above considerations will have shown that the Jewish question is fundamentally a theological problem, and in addition help to meet the oft-made objection that theological reflection is far removed from the practical situations in which the Christian is involved in his relations with his fellows.

THE MIND OF THE BRITISH SOLDIER

By MICHAEL R. POWICKE

When my generation faced the fearful prospects of a world struggle, few of us were really prepared to do so with a untroubled gaze. The naïf divisions of opinion, and the moral certainties, which characterised the reaction of our fathers to the last war, were no longer so apparent. Few of my working-class companions of this war were willing to make, or rather, to sustain, any clear cut attitude of self-righteousness in the struggle with Nazi Germany. Some of us were decided in our attitude. The 'ruling class', drawn from our Public Schools, were able to enter the struggle with a child-like belief in absolute rightness of their country; a belief which gives its own courage, and protects itself from political or moral doubt by the screening vices of snobbishness and self-righteousness. Many others were able to convince themselves, or willing to be convinced, that the moral issue was not in doubt. Yet, in general, the loyalty of the majority, and the pacifism of the minority, were equally subject to mental reservations and conditions.

Amongst the workers and lower middle-class who formed the bulk of my barrack-room acquaintances, there was a widespread, and often deceptive, class consciousness. Its salient characteristic was a hatred of the privileges on which the military hierarchy was based. The cartoonists who pictured "Tommy Atkins" as the man with the everlasting grouse, were not far wrong. Whether you picture him grimly intent on his

"spit and polish"; listening with quizzical interest to the barrack-room politician; cursing the heat and the privileged travellers of the "upper deck" on a tropical troopship; snarling back at the vicious bullets of a strafing Messerschmidt; or, as you may have done, gazing glumly at his wealthier Allies; however you picture him, he is nearly always silently cursing "them." "They" spoil everything. "They" may be the Government, the Germans, the Jews, the Americans the Trade Union leaders, the Churches. Somehow, though, "they" had come to mean, more than anyone else, the "ruling class." The work of the socialist propagandists had imposed the only widespread agreement about the underlying cause of "trouble" that existed. If it is true that this bias of opinion *has* taken its place alongside the predominant emotional bias amongst the conscript classes, it will be extremely hard ever to root out.

If the reader has followed this narrative so far, he will be asking, quite rightly, if this is not a very one-sided view of the British outlook during the war. It is. Yet if we regard this facet of "Tommy Atkins" we will have grasped "the dominant" which imposes itself continually on the subordinate themes which we must follow. I have termed those three themes, rather arbitrarily, class-consciousness, nationalism, and morality. Our discussion of the first theme can follow naturally out of the foregoing remarks.

"Class-consciousness" is not a self-explanatory term. It is too often linked with the term "class-conflict," because the comfortable are too ready to identify uncomfortable facts with (to them) unjustifiable or un-Christian attitudes. The experience of the War at once accentuated class-consciousness in Britain, and lessened the necessity of class-conflict. By a contradictory process, the regimentation and traditions of the Services made more explicit the division of economic groups, and decreased the reality of that division. The private soldiers had less personal responsibility, in most cases, than they had in civilian life. It was much easier to develop a hostile attitude to a "superior" class, when the principles of segregation and acute differences in privilege were seen to be operating in a very distinct way. At the same time, the real differences in income and personal position were far less than those which obtained in civil life before the war. The result of the former factor was the generation of a class-consciousness which has remained mainly irresponsible. In spite of the bias which resulted in the strong Labour vote of the Forces, the general sentiment of the ranker was "Wait till we get back to 'civvy street'", or "Down with everything." This was not a seriously intended threat, or a foreshadowing of British Nihilism. It was a disavowal of responsibility for constructive alternatives to a humiliating position. Again, however, we must point at least two opposing tendencies, which lent positive character to the prevalent sense of injustice.

The tendency of the strongest and most lasting character, was for certain "leader" types, politically conscious and self-righteous, to exercise a powerful in-

fluence on the apathetic majority. A few of these, perhaps, were of better education and belonged to higher intelligence groups than their companions. Many had forged their political consciousness in the fires of civilian struggle. Of these, some belonged to particular political parties, and again a few of these had experienced the mental and social discipline of organized work in the Communist party. It was, naturally enough, that distinctive leadership came from these constructive groups. No doubt the concrete political achievement of such men was infinitely greater in the civil struggle where their policies and plans had immediate relevance. It is not of particular policies, however, that we are speaking. The tendency under consideration was towards constructive and cooperative ways of thinking, as against the largely destructive and emotional attitudes of the "average" soldier. It was just because positive leadership did come from the individuals of the "Left", that the spread of anti-Semitic feeling from the personal to the political field was successfully checkmated. Although this essay is in documentation rather than interpretation, it is relevant to point out that the tendency to credit absolute validity to the relative political ends advocated by socialists, not only contained the seeds of despair for themselves, but often generated an opposing scepticism amongst their older and more experienced comrades. In this context it may be remarked that the excellent work of the Church was almost entirely confined to the field of personal morality. This exclusive and narrow variety of teaching tended to confirm the apathy of those who saw no need for decision in social affairs, while it strengthened the tendency of the politically con-

scious to regard their ends as sufficient unto themselves.

A second factor which counteracted the irresponsibility of the "class-conscious" masses in the Forces, was the official education policy of the British government. The encouragement of voluntary discussion, and the supply of informative material, have created a considerable amount of civic consciousness which, indirectly, has led to a recognition of the need for political decision. It is here that the underlying democracy in the organisation of our Forces made itself felt in spite of the apparently accentuated class divisions. Whilst I am not at liberty to write on this subject in detail, I must state my opinion that the growth of cooperative and responsible attitudes to industrial and political activities has been greatly stimulated by the foresight of our democratic leaders.

The theme of Nationalism in Great Britain, especially when considered in relation to the war-time outlooks of the "common" men, is full of pitfalls for the unwary. The guide issued to American servicemen when they were approaching these shores, warned them not to "muscle in" when they found themselves on the fringe of one of those English arguments which involved contempt and despite for our national institutions or personalities. This habit of self-criticism, and distaste for any rhetoric or reasoning which might seem to justify either Britain or her institutions, was indeed widespread at the outbreak of war. This was no mere hypocritical mask, nor was it a carefully calculated method of deceiving the foreigner. The experience of war has perhaps accustomed our ears somewhat to hearing our institutions praised and explained, but

the nasty taste remains. Does this mean that the vice of national pride is absent from the British character? Certainly not. On the secular level, it is true to say that there is an inverse ratio between our pride and our vanity. Beneath the conscious hatred of vainglory, there lies a largely subconscious but very potent national pride. The Englishman—the soldier and worker—is, did he but know it, as dependent on the "idea" of Britain as any child on its mother. The absolute, final impossibility of conceiving defeat is so complete that it is unacknowledged. Significantly, it has no basis in reason, and those reasons which are advanced carry little weight with him. This subconscious dependence, deep as an inhibition, unknown to its subjects, and despised if known, is perhaps the greatest stumbling block to Christian repentance that any community could develop. For myself, I confess that I am helpless before this false god, whom I know not and yet dimly apprehend. Let us try to acknowledge this conditioning of all our judgments, and seek courage to open our closed hearts to the wrath and mercy of God.

It is easier to be objective, but less easy to ensure general validity, when turning to the theme of personal morality. It will be understood that the difference between the civilian and the soldier becomes even more marked in this sphere. It is rightly assumed that the standards of men who are uprooted from the sustaining influence of family life, and removed from the vigilant and prying gaze of their fellow citizens, become considerably lower. In addition to this factor, the soldier is protected from the traditional restraints by the anonymity of uniform and the purposes for which

has assumed it. Finally, the absence of normal outlets for social energy, and the psychological effects of long periods of isolation and danger in the course of campaigning, lead to the excesses and brutishness which too often characterise the "relaxation" and pleasure-seeking of troops on furlough. In particular, the modern tendency to divorce sexual intercourse from the art of family making is accentuated to a degree, with the resultant spread of casual relationships, prostitution, broken homes, and broken lives. All this is true of all military forces. Yet with respect to the British troops, there are certain peculiar characteristics which merit consideration.

The revulsion of our intellectuals from the strict moral discipline typical of the Victorian era had not penetrated very deeply into the lives of most Englishmen, even after the War of 1914-18. Though the spiritual background of Puritanism was being steadily destroyed and neglected, the moral consequences were still widespread. The English "Sunday" had been assailed with little effect for a score of years, but remained substantially intact. Novelists, playwrights and publicists had built up a considerable literature on the subject of our hypocrisy and narrowness of living. Some younger churchmen attacked the national pride and Pharisaism which underlay much of our conduct. The taboos were eased; some of the absolute certainty had gone. But pleasure remained perilously allied to vice in our mentality. Too often the adolescents who grew up in these surroundings would abandon the strict mode of living of their parents, not to undertake a more adventurous and varied existence, but to pursue paths of crime and disillusion. Typical of this development was the unskilled, ugly and

unhappy "emancipation" of some of our girlhood during this war, a phenomenon which aroused much bitterness against the American troops, on to whom the blame was too easily shifted.

It might be expected that the experience of War would have eliminated that "Puritan hangover" which had already been deprived of its roots. Yet the bearing of British troops carries a startling contradiction of any such supposition. It is fascinating to find a trite generalisation borne out by repeated experience. But what person who has travelled through the war zones, would deny that the English soldier appears self-contained, shy, and silent, in comparison, say, with the voluble volatile Frenchman; or the Americans, happy as boys at school if they can find a gag, and able to introduce a hilarity into any proceedings, however drag (to the frequent resentment of my countrymen, let it be admitted). Our men have their humour, but I doubt if it is very exportable. It is, perhaps, more moody and restrained. In fact, it is part of a whole mental make-up of "dos" and "don'ts", of respect for private property, and of personal pride. It is these qualities which prevent our presence from jarring so much on occupied populations as that of most other nations. The statistics and combined experiences coming from Europe seem to bear out this thesis, and if we define morality in the Victorian way, our troops are easily the most moral in Europe.

This "Puritanism" is not avowed, and I hope it is understood that is only relative to the general standard of military morality. It is closely allied to the "sense of right and wrong" which we have seen in its typical expression as a

"sense of grievance." A plea of necessity is expected if a man goes to any excess, if he goes to a brothel, or breaks any other law of behaviour. Should a man's behaviour stray far from the accepted code without such a plea being advanced, he is regarded as either a freak or an outcaste. Similar taboos apply to a hundred points of behaviour, and determine the usual reaction to "foreign" ways. It is not our purpose to pursue this interesting subject in detail. We must rather ask, in the first place, if this is good; in the second, will it persist; and thirdly, what is to be our attitude to it. I think we must affirm the sense of right and sense of justice, while we attack the pride of spirit and self-righteousness which accompany them. Yet these social and moral virtues are already under attack, not from the evangelists, but from the cynics—or "the children of

darkness." So our official churchmen, and especially our chaplains, have often sought to strengthen the ties between self-interest and good behaviour by such slogans as "Morality pays" and by appeals to British snobbishness. Can we hold in tension the demand to perfection and the facts of profound sinfulness, without compromising and polluting the purity of the Word of God? The issues are much greater than the survival of our nation and the maintenance of our Empire. In the words of Niebhur (*An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*), our task is none other than "to establish that which is good on a durable basis, so that the relative gains will not be lost through the growth of cynicism and despair, or the awful cataclysm that must wait on false pride and self-righteousness before the nations."

MICHAEL POWICKE

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOOD FOR EUROPE

The Committee on Food for Europe was organized last November to give to members and friends of the Fellowship an opportunity to send food packages to European Protestant pastors, and German and Jewish refugees. A letter explaining the project was sent to all members of the Fellowship early in December.

Requests for 215 names have been answered. These have included French, Dutch and Italian (Waldensian) pastors whose names were secured largely through the Church Committee on Overseas Relief and Reconstruction of the Federal Council, and refugees sponsored by the International Committee for Aid to Professionals, Artists and Scholars. All those requesting names have promised to send at least one parcel a month.

The Committee has received \$709 in cash contributions. This has been used to send packages of food and clothing to pastors and refugees. All money sent is spent for food. There is no administrative expense, since all work has been done with volunteer help.

The response to the appeal demonstrates the eagerness of many to do something about the suffering in Europe, and the mounting number of packages being sent in spite of official and material obstacles testifies to this desire. Some churches, colleges and seminaries have been particularly active in organizing to send packages. It was hoped that a new, large-scale organization known as CARE (Committee for American Relief in Europe) would be operating at this time to enable Americans to help

more efficiently and economically than through individually-sent packages. However, this committee has been bogged down in official red tape and the most immediate way to help is still through parcels sent by individuals to people in Europe who are in need. Moreover, the sense of individual concern expressed by the packages and also by letters, which are especially important, is not the least valuable aspect of this type of help.

Already some of the packages sent by Fellowship members have been received. A card from a French woman contains the following message addressed to the Fellowship:

"Many, many thanks for the marvelous parcel you have sent me. I cannot tell you how I was touched and rejoiced when I unpacked all these delicious things which shall help me to endure the hard time that we must cross here in this magnificent country. It is refreshing to think that there are men in other countries sympathizing with the poor "refugees" and that they are socialists . . ."

A letter from a German-Jewish, anti-fascist refugee now living in France tells of the desperate need among these people:

"We have lost all we had during our stages in camps, concealment, flight, etc. We begin really anew with nothing but our hands, capacities and the will to succeed. . . . Now we have an abandoned barrack where in former times a small farmer lived with three cows. But it is all in wood, without windows

(broken), without furniture (the most necessary we made of boxes—we learnt in the concentration camps, you know), without light, without water. . . . We have no shoes, no undergarments, no towels, no stockings. . . . I am sure, for I feel it in your letter, that you will do all you can, and you do it so goodheartedly that we too can accept or take it without feeling ashamed, but only if you really don't deprive yourself."

The following is from a French Protestant minister, a professor at Montpellier:

"It is with joyful surprise that we received your letter. We have had occasion many times during these past years to realize the reality of Christian brotherhood across the world. You have brought a new proof of it to us and we thank you for it with all our hearts . . . At the beginning of the war, I was mobilized as an officer in the infantry; after having fought in Holland and in Belgium, I was, along with numerous comrades, made prisoner at Dunkirk. . . . I lived for five years in a prison camp in Germany. Liberated by the Russians last April, I was repatriated in June by the American troops. . . . During all the captivity, I was able to exercise a pastoral and professional activity among my Protestant comrades; we had together a life of fellowship which God richly blessed, and the memory of which erased for me all the sufferings we bore in common. At that time, we were marvellously helped, spiritually by the Oecumenical Council—and we know well all that the American Churches have done to permit it to accomplish its work. Then again, at a time when famine attained for us a dangerous degree, there were the parcels of the Ameri-

can Red Cross which permitted us to exist. We have therefore toward your country an immense debt of gratitude which we do not know how to repay. And now you wish to help us still more! You know therefore that France is recovering but slowly and that the ministers of France, for whom the situation was already very modest before the war, have serious difficulties to surmount . . . We have, in our district, practically no milk; no butter at all; very little sugar or chocolate. We are beginning to find a little oil, but no soap (or of very poor quality). The situation is serious above all for textile articles—cloth, socks, stockings, clothing, even more serious for shoes. We think within six months or a year that great progress will have been made, but we are not there yet. Commerce is not free, and everything is very complex. Prices are very high and the standard of living has gone down a great deal. Only those who produce are able to procure what they want by practicing exchange. Money alone is insufficient as a means of transaction."

Our experience and later information suggest the following to those sending packages:

1. Packages ought to be wrapped very securely to avoid breakage. Breakage frequently results in loss of contents. Parcels should be plainly marked GIFT PACKAGE and the letters G.L.V. (general limited value) printed on them so no duty will be charged. Do not expect delivery of packages in less than two months.

2. Avoid sending glass containers. Coffee is not now prohibited for export. Fats of all kinds, powdered milk and all sweets are most welcome. With the approach of spring, vegetable seeds should be included in packages. Used clothing can be sent duty free and all kinds, especially shoes, are desperately needed. Pastors need

bicycle repair supplies, tire cement, etc. Many pastors are asking for American books and periodicals. Inquire at your post office about special rates for literature.

3. Do not put tobacco in food or clothing packages. This causes customs inspection of food packages which are rarely opened otherwise. Send tobacco separately. Soap can be packed in clothing parcels and is badly needed.

4. Avoid unnecessary trouble and delay by strictly observing the eleven pound limit.

5. Germany has not been opened for mailing. You can help there by sending through American soldiers.

The committee wishes to thank all

those who have helped so generously with the project. If subscribers to Christianity and Society would like to participate, they are urged to write to Mrs. Audrey Abrecht, Union Theological Seminary, 99 Claremont Avenue, New York 27, for the name of some European family to whom they may send regular packages and for additional instructions on what to send and how to pack it. Cash contributions should be sent to Dr. John C. Bennett, Union Theological Seminary, New York 27, who is the treasurer of the Committee on Food for Europe.

PAUL ABRECHT

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Michael R. Powicke, who contributes an article on the situation in the British Army, graduated with first class honors from the University College, Oxford, and is now, after serving in the ranks, an Education Officer in the British Army. He is the nephew of F. M. Powicke of Oxford.

John Dillenberger is doing graduate work at Union Seminary after serving three years as Chaplain in the Navy.

Arthur Roy Eckardt is a graduate

student at Columbia University and Union Seminary.

John Hutchinson is Professor of Philosophy of Religion at the College of Wooster.

Franklin H. Littell is in charge of the religious work at the University of Michigan. His article on pacifism has a special significance because he was himself one of the leaders of the pacifist movement in recent years.

We are receiving some extra copies of "*The Socialist Christian*", organ of The Socialist Christian League of Great Britain, and would be glad to receive subscriptions for them, which can be had for 50¢ per year.

BOOK REVIEWS

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING AND RELIGIOUS TRUTH, by *Erich Frank*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1945. 209 pages. \$2.50.

This wise little book is just what the title claims it to be, a philosophical understanding of religious truth. More precisely it is an approach from the context of contemporary philosophic thought to such fundamental Christian truths as the transcendence of God, the creation of the world, the nature of individual personality, and the like. One is particularly impressed with the way in which the author's philosophic insight throws genuine light upon Christian truth, and conversely with the way in which Christian truth appears as the answer to philosophy's quest for meaning in the world and in human life. Philosophy and religion are related as question and answer, and under Dr. Frank's able pen, both of them gain by their mutual relations. The book shows on every page the influence of ideas, familiar to readers of this journal, stemming from Paul, Augustine, and Kierkegaard. Indeed to this reviewer it seems one of the clearest and most persuasive statements of the viewpoint in current religious writing. This is not to say that the author is limited to any one thinker or group of thinkers. He moves with easy erudition and penetrating insight through all the aspects and episodes of western thought.

The argument of the book begins with man, great in his reason, yet in the contemporary situation finding life empty of meaning, finding also that "the root

of his existence lies deeper than his thought can penetrate".(8) The human situation, characterized as it is, by such inexorable facts as death, moral failure, social guilt and struggle, drives man to a recognition of his "dependence on an objective power by which our whole existence is determined".(16)

Moreover in our human attitude toward this objective power, there is an element of stark venture, of faith and decision. For the classical arguments for God, considered simply as arguments, fall short of full logical necessity. To the believer they serve as analyses and expositions of the content of faith, but to the nonbeliever they do not carry conviction. Rather, at the real foundation of any philosophy, Christian or non-Christian, stands a decision of faith. "Some prelogical presupposition, some pre-rational belief must unknowingly be shaping thought . . . the same is true of the Positivist . . . it must be an irrational belief, this selfsame belief in the perceptible world and in natural life which to him is the ultimate truth upon which he has decided to stake his whole existence once for all".(39)

The proper object of this faith is the transcendent God of the Hebrew Christian tradition. This conception of God stands in sharp contrast to the immanent God of the Greeks, a spirit indwelling nature. Its impact upon the philosophic thought of the west is ably developed, especially with regard to such problems as the conception of the possibility of atheism, and the ontological argument for God. By contrast to the Greeks, the this-worldly attitude of modern thought

and life is of a more desperate character, being the attitude of men who turn from the Beyond to stake their all upon the things of this world.

From God as transcendent, wholly other, the distinctive Hebrew Christian beliefs follow in order. Only on such a presupposition about God does the doctrine of creation make sense. Likewise was this belief about God which enabled the early Christians to break through ancient cyclic ideas of history and produce the sense of destiny so deeply impressed upon the mind of the West. From this source also have flowed the ideas of human personality and creative human freedom. There is also a particularly able discussion of the respective roles of reason (symbolized by Caesar) and faith (symbolized by Christ) in the making of history.

The viewpoint of this book will be familiar to many readers of Christianity and Society. It is an able and lucid discussion of some of the cardinal tenets of Biblical religion.

JOHN A. HUTCHISON

THE FAITH OF A PROTESTANT,
by *W. Burnet Easton, Jr.* Macmillan.
\$1.50.

There is a disparity between the renewal of a theological concern directed to the roots of Protestantism and the lack of a real understanding in the church of what it means to be Protestant. Professor Easton tries to bridge that gap by stating "some of the major beliefs of the Christian faith in simple, non-technical language which laymen and women can understand". What Dr. Niebuhr and Dr. Tillich have done for theological study, Professor Easton makes available

to the church and thereby defies a prevalent contention that this could not be accomplished.

Professor Easton carefully steers his way between a polemic directed only against the distortions of faith within and without the church and an orthodox statement which might not have bearing for our time. The genius of the book lies exactly in that it is made relevant to our time and yet has as its major portion a positive statement of Protestant faith which is valid for every age. Its scope includes God, man, Jesus Christ, the Church, the Kingdom, Social Action, and the Trinity.

Summarizing the faiths by which men live, whether grounded in moral or philosophical proofs of God or even in atheism, as basically inadequate if useful at all, Professor Easton gives witness to the Christian God "who has laid hold of us" and "who has revealed Himself uniquely in Jesus Christ". His doctrine of man is that man is neither on the road to perfection nor incapable of any good; man is "essentially good and essentially self-corrupting at the same time". He discards the ideas of Jesus that make him sheerly human or a Divine idea, and contends for the total picture of "Jesus Christ" on the basis of the Biblical record. Striking equally against Catholicism and the common notion that one can be a Christian without the Church, he defines the church as "the God given means for continuing the work of salvation which He began in Jesus Christ . . . , (the) fellowship of persons who are united by their common loyalty to God and to each other in Jesus Christ".

With similar logic, neither optimistic nor completely pessimistic views of history are correct, since the Kingdom is

both present and future. Within this view of the Kingdom, the basis of social action is not the possibility of achievement, an inherent presupposition of the social gospel, but "obedience to God", even though we may fail. "We work for social and economic justice, for social brotherhood and a warless world, in a word, for the Kingdom, not because we expect ever to realize these states here on earth, but because working for them to the limits of our ability and energy is the only way we can fulfill the demands of God upon us as revealed by Christ".

The way in which the author relates Biblical criticism to Christian faith in the consideration of the Resurrection and the Person of Christ points to a direction which would prove fruitful to much of contemporary Old and New Testament criticism. There is also a provocative chapter on why the Trinity is so essential for Protestantism.

Professor Easton is aware that oversimplification may be inevitable in treating a subject matter so vast in such a brief compass—some seventy-six pages. One would like to ask questions about his view of the "Fall as a Fall up rather than down". Also, since he is writing to those who know something of the corruption of the church, one wishes that his view of sin might have been applied to the church which he defends. In spite of this, the amazing fact is that the major problems, instead of being over-simplified, have been thoroughly explored in a simple and direct way. This book should prove invaluable in work in the church and with the unchurched.

JOHN DILLENBERGER

THE AGE OF JACKSON, by *Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.* Little, Brown & Co. \$5.00.

The age of Jackson is more than merely an age in American democracy. It is the turning point where democratic theory came in contact with the new realities of a budding industrialism; and American democracy proved its capacity to adjust itself to the problems, with which large scale capitalism on the one hand and an industrial proletariat on the other, confronted it. Schlesinger's history of this age is more than mere history, though it is very good history. It is good history because the author completely masters the historical detail, and has a shrewd insight into the characters and motives, as well as the public policies, of most of the great figures of that day.

It is more than history because Schlesinger is a political philosopher as well as historian and withall a genuine believer in democracy. This book is a perfect refutation of the idea that history must be written "objectively", or that the alternative is partisan propaganda. One has the feeling that Schlesinger is deeply informed in his own sense of values by the democratic creed. His history of the Jacksonian era thus becomes a kind of self-revelation of the history of American democracy. Considering the tremendously perplexities which confront democracy in this age of technics which sometimes tempt even the optimist to despair about the American future, the book is reassuring. One feels that we may be able to do as well in the end in facing the new problems of late capitalism as the Jacksonian era did in facing those of early capitalism.

Schlesinger shows that Jackson was nothing more than an uncouth frontiersman who led the rabble into the White House to the chagrin of the "better" citizens. He and his colleagues were, in fact, exponents of a democratic creed which was better understood by the new industrial masses than by the frontier. It was an equalitarian, rather than a libertarian creed; and the frontier was not libertarian. It frankly used the power of government to check the indeterminate power of the business community. The business community usurped all the charges of "executive usurpation" at Jackson with which we have become again familiar in the Roosevelt administration.

No book has given us so clear a history of the transmutation of original Jeffersonianism into a false creed of privilege. The business men, who wanted banking privileges free of government restraint, used Jefferson's name to develop policies which Jefferson would have abhorred, even as they were developing an urban-commercial society which Jefferson regarded as the antithesis of democracy. Meanwhile the democratic masses were shrewd enough to understand that the essence of Jefferson's democracy was in Jackson's policy, though Jackson had to strengthen federal authority to accomplish his ends. While Jefferson believed that "the least possible government is the best possible government".

Schlesinger also gives an imaginative account of the transmutation of the conservative party from the "Federalists" who frankly feared the people and loyalty to the "Whigs", who pretended to believe in equality even more than the democrats. They proved it by run-

ning a presidential candidate without a program but emanating from a bogus log cabin against President Van Buren, who had faithfully carried out the Jacksonian policy. They introduced the circus features into the campaign which have since become a permanent fixture of American politics. By winning the campaign they proved the efficacy of hocus in politics.

The intellectual sterility of American conservatism clearly has its origin in this Harrison campaign. From that day on American conservatism has been too much afraid of the votes of the common people to frankly avow its actual creed. But it has rightly estimated the political intelligence of the masses as sufficiently low to guarantee the frequent success of political programs based upon deception.

It is surprising how much light a study of the 1840's throws upon the history of 1930-45. At least this is the effect when as skilled an historian as young Arthur Schlesinger illumines the past for us.

R. N.

THE CHRISTIAN SIGNIFICANCE OF KARL MARX, *by Alexander Miller*. S. C. M. Press. 6 shillings.

This significant little volume is published in Britain by the Student Christian Movement Press. It is to be hoped that it will soon be published here; for it is the profoundest little book to come to my attention in a long time. Many Americans in Christian student movement circles know Alexander Miller as a former student leader in New Zealand and more recently as an associate of George McCloud in the Iona community in Scotland. He is known for both his

strong Marxist political convictions and for his "Barthian" theological tendencies. If anyone should think that these two are incompatible positions let him read this book; for what we have here is a creative relationship between profound theology and social theory. Barth could hardly have written this book because he allows ultimate theological perspectives to reduce social judgments to insignificance, unless, as was recently the case, social and political evils rise to explicit religious proportions.

On the other hand the usual school of liberal Christian socialists could not have written such a book either. Miller's criticisms of John MacMurray's "Creative Society" could well be regarded as his criticism of all forms of Christian Marxism which seek to dress Marx up in Christian garb without recognizing that it is precisely the ultimate religious claims of historical redemption which Marx makes which bring error into his system; while on the level of diagnosing the maladjustments of modern capitalist society Marx is still essentially correct. Miller for instance rightly condemns MacMurray's identification of the "son of Man" with the idea of the "common man" and the conclusion that it is the common man who must be the Messiah of our age. The Messianic claim for the working class is what is wrong with Marxism. Yet the working man and the common man are instruments of justice and of historical renewal; because those who suffer most from injustice must be the primary agents of its abolition. The common hold does indeed have a special destiny under divine providence; but if he presumes too much upon it he corrupts his destiny.

I do not think that Miller fully understands to what degree Stalinism is in fact, such a corruption of Marxist Messianism, inherent in the this-worldly and utopian character of the Marxist plan of salvation. But he fully understands the issues at stake between Christianity and Marxism as most so-called Christian Marxists do not; and he is able to explain the difference as the few who do understand are not able; and finally he understands that the ultimate issues raised in Christian faith must not beguile us from our great historic tasks, of which one is to achieve justice in a technical age.

This book is full of genuine Christian faith and wisdom in a small compass. It will do inestimable good particularly in the circles of our Christian students in the coming decades. If they are at all sensitive they will express themselves radically in their political and economic theories; and they must understand that this is not only allowed but necessary from the standpoint of any profound faith. Yet they must also recognize that no promise of justice for human society can obviate the faith by which man is related to the God who reigns over his life in judgment and mercy.

R. N.

WHAT IS CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION? *John Baillie*. Scribners. New York. 59 pages. \$1.00.

This brief volume possesses the virtues we have come to look for in Dr. Baillie's work, crisp and trenchant phrase, wide learning, and careful thought. And it confronts the reader squarely with the central spiritual problem of our time: will we and can we regain civilization, regain our grasp upon the Christian faith? If we can and do, Baillie sees

me hope for the future. If we do not, then it follows that the moral and social fruit of that faith will atrophy and die. Baillie is insistent upon the Christian conception of God as that Other who stands above all time and history, and the divine source of the Christian virtues which illuminate our mortal ways. "For the earthly hope holds no promise of its own imperfect fulfillment as it refracts in the medium of the temporal the light of the hope that is eternal; so that the surest way to its disappointment would be that in too much cherishing it, we should lose sight of that greater light which is its source. In proportion as a society relaxes its hold upon the eternal it ensures the corruption of the temporal".(59)

The historical sections of the essay deal successively with the role of the Christians and the Christian Church in the ancient Roman empire, with the integrating and unifying role of Christianity in mediaeval civilization, with the reformers, especially Calvin and his Britan followers in England and America. The modern situation with its intellectual background in the enlightenment and its practical background in the industrial revolution is ably depicted.

Baillie surveys the alternatives for the Church in the present situation. Will it once again, the dissociation of the Church from an evil and a crumbling civilization, a return to catacomb or monastery? Or will it on the other hand be an effort to impregnate the mind and heart of the world with the Christian faith so that its leaders and people will be informed and guided by Christian principles. While presenting the case for the former alternative sym-

pathetically, Baillie argues for the latter course. He does so particularly because he believes the alternatives for modern man are Christian faith or that moral and spiritual emptiness which can lead only to the atavistic paganism lately so apparent in Germany.

Baillie is careful not to make religious belief a requirement for membership in civil society. Rather he argues for an "open Christian civilization" in which all the modern achievements of freedom of thought and faith will be preserved, but in which the mind and heart of the people will be so impregnated with Christian ideals that Christian behavior on the part of leaders will follow normally and naturally.

If there is any one regret about this book it is that Baillie has not given more attention to the positive relations between Christianity and civilization. He claims that the Christian's attitude must be a double one. "He must strive to bring it as near the Christian ideal as is possible in a world of sinful men but he must never give it his absolute approval or unconditional loyalty; he must place in it only such a strictly qualified hope as would even, if it were to suffer complete shipwreck, leave his ultimate hope as securely anchored as before".(56) But the greater part of the book is concerned with the latter and not the former relation. For many readers this is too bad, for we would like very much to know Baillie's views on the specific ways in which our present situation may be made more Christian—a subject to which he and the Church of Scotland have lately been giving serious and creative thought.

JOHN A. HUTCHISON

AN ESSAY ON MAN, by *Ernst Cassirer*.
Yale University Press. 1944. 237
pages. \$3.00.

The subtitle, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Culture," defines the task of this book—the last from the distinguished pen of the late Ernst Cassirer. The book states in brief and readable fashion the thesis of Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. Using the concept, symbol, as a tool of analysis, and defining man as the *animal symbolicum*, the author examines successively such various aspects of human culture as myth and religion, language, art, history, and science. Amid this diversity of human activities is discovered a unity in the employment of symbolic forms.

What will perhaps be of most interest to readers of this journal is the contrast between Cassirer's treatment of man, and that of Niebuhr, Tillich, and others of similar view. The difference is not a matter of conflict, but of so different a viewpoint that the two accounts of man never join issue. Cassirer begins with an historical analysis of self-knowledge from the Greeks to the present concluding with the present "problematic state" in which "the antagonism of ideas is not merely a grave theoretical problem but an imminent threat to the whole extent of our ethical and cultural life . . . our technical instruments for observation and experimentation have been immensely improved, and our analyses have become sharper and more penetrating. We appear nevertheless not to have found a method for the mastery and organization of their material. Unless we find a clue of Ariadne to lead us out of this labyrinth we can offer no real insight into the general character of human culture, we shall remain lost in a mass

of disconnected and disintegrated data which seem to lack all conceptual unity". (P. 22.)

The "clue of Ariadne" proposed by Cassirer is man's symbolic activity. Human symbols are clearly distinguished from signals in animal behavior both by their greater flexibility and by the structure of meaning to which they refer. Indeed genetic analysis of symbols is clearly rejected for structural and functional analysis. Following this analysis of the nature of symbolism, the concept is applied successively to myth and religion, to language, art, history, and science.

One does not need to deny the rich and fruitful insight of Cassirer's analysis, to raise the question of whether his concept, symbolism, constitutes a "clue of Ariadne," or whether indeed it will provide the kind of self-knowledge which Cassirer indicates as so necessary in the present situation. The author treats religion as one aspect among others of human culture, which it obviously is. But there is no intimation that it may be more than that. There is no intimation of the central role in human culture that religion has at times assumed, and which religion demands for itself. May it not be that the Christian faith can provide both self-knowledge and the unification of culture which Professor Cassirer claims to find in man's symbolic activity? Some of us think so.

JOHN A. HUTCHISON

GOD AND THE ATOM, by *Ronald Knox*. Sheed and Ward. \$2.00.

Monsignor Knox's book on the meaning of the discovery of nuclear fission is the best religious interpretation of the crisis of our time yet to appear. Knox

discusses the relation between the Christian conception of providence and scientific development in general and shows how gradually in modern culture the concept of natural law displaced the Christian idea of providence, until modern culture was suddenly confronted with the atomic bomb as the end product of modern science. This development disproved the faith of modern man that scientific development was inevitably beneficent, revealed the interaction between human freedom and historical destiny and thereby proved that historical development is not as simply meaningful as modern man imagined. One might say that it is easier to believe that history is meaningful because it ultimately stands under divine sovereignty than to believe that it is meaningful because it is determined by natural laws. History is actually created because

human freedom is able to defy those laws.

Monsignor Knox writes with great insight on the spiritual crisis of our time but makes the mistake of assuming that Christian faith has finally no concern with the fate of nations and civilizations but only with the individual. "No Christian must accuse himself of the sin of despair" he writes "because he finds himself thinking that his country will be beaten by its enemies or because he finds himself thinking that the world is very evil". Yet his own desperate search for meaning the tragedies of modern history proves this individualism to be untrue to human experience as it is inconsistent with Biblical faith, which does understand that the destiny of nations belongs to the patterns of life which await divine fulfillment.

R. N.

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Reprint of review article by Prof. J. C. Rylaarsdam, of the University of Chicago, about *The Bible Is Human*, published in the Journal of Religion, together with comments by the author of the book. Also pamphlets replying to Professors H. G. May and C. T. Craig, of Oberlin Divinity School. Also reprint of article in the American Journal of Economics and Sociology, entitled "Can Britain's Labor Government Succeed?"

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